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1 Introduction
Profit sharing agreements are among the most common types of contractual arrangements for
firms in a supply chain. Under such agreements, the retailer, as a provider to a consumer market,
engages another firm (the supplier) as a contractor to provide essential supplies for the operation.
In addition to paying for the essential supplies, the retailer pays the supplier a certain portion
of the profit generated from the operation. In this way, profit sharing agreements serve to align
incentives between the retailer and the supplier in a supply chain.
A variant of this concept, known as sharecropping, has been used in agriculture where the
landlord allows the tenant to use his land in exchange for a specified share of production. How-
ever, the terms of payment can vary widely. For instance, the landlord can bear a portion of the
production cost, and thus demand a higher share of the production, or may bear the entire risk
and employ the farmers as fixed wage workers. Consider, for example, B-BOVID, an agricultural
firm operating in Takoradi, Ghana. In 2014, this firm introduced a unique profit sharing model
to alleviate the plight of oil palm farmers in the region. The farmers would sell their palm fruits
to B-BOVID for on-the-spot money. B-BOVID would then refine the palm fruits for sale and
return a portion of the profits generated back to the farmers, based on the quantity supplied
by the farmers to the company. Thus, in addition to reducing poverty, the company incen-
tivises and sustains the interest of the farmers in oil palm plantations. Stiglitz (1989) presents
early economic analysis of these contractual forms, and confirms the benefits of sharecropping in
streamlining the allocation of risk and rewards among the different parties involved.
The profit sharing contract is also prevalent in the entertainment industry. See for instance,
Weinstein (1998) and the references therein for a discussion of the evolution of profit sharing
contracts in Hollywood, and an interesting discussion on the difference between “net profit”
sharing and “gross profit” sharing (i.e., revenue sharing) contract. Filson et al. (2005) study
the profit sharing contracts written between certain movie distributors and a theatre chain in
St. Louis, Missouri, and conclude through empirical analysis that the profit sharing contracts
“evolved to help distributors and exhibitors share risks and overcome measurement problems
and not to overcome asymmetric information problems.”
In the natural resource industry, the profit sharing agreement (or in the form of production
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sharing agreement, (PSA)) has been practiced for a long period of time. Under a PSA, the
government engages a foreign oil company to operate petroleum exploration. After deducting the
royalty and operating costs, the remainder (called profit oil) will be split between the government
and company.
For many commodity products, such as oil and agricultural commodities, sellers face not only
uncertain demands but also extreme price fluctuations. For example, according to the United
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), food prices have fluctuated wildly over the
last few years. The index rose from 122 in 2006 to 214 in June 2008 as the 2007-2008 food price
crisis unfolded. The index then fell rapidly in the second half of 2008, sinking to 140 in March
2009. In the latter half of 2010, it increased considerably, and reaching 215 in December1. The
prices for agricultural products are often largely influenced by supply and demand factors, such
as weather conditions, population changes, and food stocks, which lead to considerable risk and
uncertainty in the agricultural commodity price. Similarly, the price of oil has also fluctuated
significantly over the last few years. Therefore, facing such high price and demand risks, profit
sharing contracts allow the supply chain partners to share risks.
An additional challenge is to establish a reasonable method to share profits. One approach
is to use the Nash bargaining framework, where the total rents of the supply chain operation
are split between the supplier and retailer according to the bargaining strength of the parties
involved, together with the value of outside options for the partners. The approach has been
applied in the natural resource industry to provide a benchmark to disentangle the effect of other
competing theories on the bargaining outcome (cf. McMillan and Waxman (2007)). However,
the distribution of profits in the Nash bargaining model often depends on subjective input of the
relative bargaining power of the parties. More importantly, these models ignore the fact that
contractual elements in the profit sharing agreements are often based on full knowledge of the
selling price, demand, and/or cost of operations, which are often not assured due to the difficulty
in fully characterizing the distributions of random elements. Accordingly, in many cases, we may
only have confidence in estimating some distribution parameters, such as mean and variance.
This problem is compounded by the provision of the retailer for the operational costs in the
computation of net profit. The evaluation of this cost component is often the bone of contention
between the two parties involved in the profit sharing agreements, as often seen in the mining
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and entertainment industries.
Motivated by these concerns, in this paper, we develop a distributionally robust Stackelberg
game model to study the profit sharing contract design problem with limited information about
demand and price distributions. Aghassi and Bertsimas (2006) present a distribution-free, robust
optimization model for incomplete information games, in which the players commonly know an
uncertainty set of possible game parameter values without knowledge of exact distributional
information and each player seeks to maximize the worst-case expected payoff. Their proposed
robust game model presumes that each player uses a robust optimization, and therefore a worst-
case approach to the uncertainty to enable mutual prediction of the game outcomes. We adopt
the same assumption that the partial distribution information on price and demand is common
knowledge between the two players in our base model analysis (the case of demand information
asymmetry is discussed in the online appendix). That is, both the retailer and supplier have
access to the same demand information, such as POS data, and market price information. As
the exact distribution information on demand and price is not available, both parties apply a
distributionally robust approach to minimize their worst-case expected profit.
As a direct application, we show that this approach can be used to derive testable restrictions
on the outcomes in the supply chain setting. More specifically, given the decisions of the supplier
and retailer, the unit cost of production (incurred by the supplier) and the selling price infor-
mation (mean and variance), but without the demand and selling price correlation information,
we develop testable conditions on the outcomes that are consistent with the prediction of the
distributionally robust Stacklberg game based on some random demand model. In the traditional
Stackelberg game model, this is a difficult problem because finding the optimal wholesale price is
already a complicated problem, and a well known result by Lariviere and Porteus (2001) indicates
that the problem is solvable when the demand distribution satisfies the “increasing-generalized
failure-rate” property. A closed-form expression for the optimal wholesale price is known only for
specific demand distribution (for instance, when demand is uniform with support in a bounded
interval). Otherwise, a closed-form expression is generally not available. Thus, it is difficult
to find testable conditions on the optimal wholesale price and order quantity. Interestingly, as
shown in this paper, this problem becomes tractable in a distributionally robust Stackelberg
game model. By building a prescriptive model on the optimal behavior in the choice of the
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contract parameters and operational decisions, we hope to find testable relationships between
these parameters if the parties act in a rational manner as prescribed by the Stackelberg game.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant
literature. Section 3 introduces the distributionally robust model. We derive the robust ordering
decision of the last stage problem in Section 4, and address the profit sharing contract design
problem in Section 5. We then extend our model to the price dependent demand case in Section
6. We also discuss other potential applications of this model in Appendix A. Section 7 reports
numerical studies. Concluding thoughts are provided in Section 8. All proofs to the technical
results are relegated to Appendix B.
2 Literature Review
Our research is related to two streams of literature. The first stream of literature is robust inven-
tory management, where decisions have to be made with incomplete distribution information.
One common approach to this situation, according to the literature, is the max-min approach,
which was pioneered by Scarf (1958) to model the newsvendor problem with only mean and
variance of the demand distribution known, aiming to find an order quantity to maximize the
worst-case expected profit over all possible distributions with the given mean and variance. Scarf
derives a closed-form solution for the robust order quantity. Gallego and Moon (1993) provide
a more concise proof of Scarf’s ordering rule and apply this approach to several variants of the
newsvendor problem, for example, the recourse case and the fixed ordering cost case. Moon and
Choi (1995) apply the max-min approach to the newsvendor problem with customer balking. A
wide variety of extensions to the basic robust newsvender problem have been addressed in the
literature, including multi-period (e.g., Gallego 1992, Moon and Gallego 1994), multi-echelon
(e.g., Moon and Choi 1997), and multi-item (e.g., Moon and Silver 2000) extensions. Readers
may refer to Gallego et al. (2001) for a more detailed review of the early literature. Mamani
et al. (2016) obtain a closed-form solution to a multi-period inventory management problem,
using a class of uncertainty sets motivated by central limit theorem. More recently, Ben-Tal
et al. (2005) apply the min-max approach to a multi-period stochastic inventory management
problem with a flexible commitment contract. Raza (2014) applies the max-min approach to
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the newsvendor problem with joint pricing and inventory decisions. Han et al. (2014) enrich the
analysis by combining both risk aversion and ambiguity aversion to obtain a closed-form solu-
tion. Another approach to making decisions with limited distribution information is the minimax
regret principle, which involves minimizing the maximum opportunity cost of not making the
optimal decision. For example, Yue et al. (2006) apply this regret approach to a newsvendor
problem when only the mean and variance of demand distribution are known. Perakis and Roels
(2008) further investigate the minimax regret newsvendor problem by considering more general
partial demand information scenarios. Hanasusanto et al. (2015) use a distributionally robust
approach to study the multi-item newsvendor problem and obtain a related SDP relaxation for
this NP-hard problem.
Whereas most papers investigate the robust decisions from the perspective of a single deci-
sion maker, there are several papers examining the robust decisions in a game setting. Jiang et
al. (2011) study a robust inventory competition problem with stock-out substitution and asym-
metric information on the support of demand distribution, under the criteria of absolute regret
minimization. Wagner (2015) employs the robust optimization approach to a supply chain with
a price-only contract, where the supplier may not correctly assess the informational state of the
retailer. Wagner compares the order quantity and profit of individual firms and the supply chain
under different informational states of the two parties and concludes that information advantage
does not necessarily benefit a firm. A common feature in the extant literature on robust inven-
tory models is that randomness comes only from demand. This study extends the literature by
investigating the robust max-min inventory decision when both demand and price are random.
Another related literature stream is the use of profit or revenue sharing contract in supply
chains, where the retailer pays the supplier a unit price, plus a percentage of the profit/revenue
generated from sales. Pasternack (2002) investigates a newsvendor problem with both wholesale
price and revenue sharing contracts. Cachon and Lariviere (2005) provide a comprehensive study
on the use of revenue sharing contract to achieve channel coordination and compare revenue
sharing with a number of other supply chain contracts. Tang and Kouvelis (2014) study supply
chain coordination in the presence of supply uncertainty, and propose a pay-back-revenue sharing
contract to coordinate the supply chain. These papers focus on the design of the contract
parameters from a central planner perspective to coordinate the supply chain. Other papers
6
study revenue sharing contracts in decentralized supply chains. For example, Wang et al. (2004)
investigate the channel performance under a consignment contract with revenue sharing, where
the retailer, acting as the leader, decides the share of sales revenue to be remitted to the supplier,
and the supplier sets the retail price and delivery quantity. Gerchak and Wang (2003) consider
an assembly problem in which the firm assembling the final product decides the allocation of
sales revenue between the firm and several suppliers producing the components.
Revenue sharing contract has been shown to allow the supply chain profit to be arbitrarily
divided between the supplier and retailer. If the two contract parameters, wholesale price and
profit share, are both set by one party, then this party can extract most of the supply chain
profit, leaving the other party only the reservation profit. Therefore, in this paper, we let each
supply chain partner determine one of the two contract parameters. As the supplier incurs the
costs of making products, he is in a better position to set the wholesale price. The retailer, as a
price-taker, determines the profit share. We model this as a three-stage Stackelberg game. The
retailer, acting as the leader, decides a profit share that benefits herself, and then the supplier
manipulates his share of the supply chain profit by choosing the wholesale price. Finally, given
the agreed-upon contract, the retailer decides the order quantity.
3 The Model
There are two common scenarios to model the market price. One models the case of a monopoly
market, where a dominant seller has the power to endogenously set the retail price. Thus,
product price is an internal decision, and demand is typically modelled as a price dependent
function. Another considers an oligopoly market with a few key competing sellers or a market
with a number of small sellers, whose actions jointly determine a competitive market price. In
this case, product price is typically exogenous and random in advance, subject to some factors
that cannot be observed at the time strategic decisions are made, such as competitors’ prices,
total market supply and demand. We consider the latter case with both product demand and
price being random in our base model, and analyze the monopolistic case in Section 6.
We modify the setup in McMillan and Waxman (2007) to find the optimal split of profit
between the retailer and supplier. In this setting, with only the first and second moments
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information on the demand and selling price of the product, the retailer would like to devise a
profit sharing formula with a key supplier to maximize her own profit. Through sharing, the
retailer hopes to procure from the supplier at a lower wholesale price.
To maximize supply chain profit, the retailer would also need to determine the capac-
ity/quantity investment decision, Q, in advance. Let D(≥ 0) denote the hitherto unknown
demand and Ps(≥ 0) denote the uncertain selling price. Both Ps and D are unknown when the
contractual decisions are made, and the retailer cannot sell more than the installed capacity Q.
The capacity is sourced from an external supplier with a unit cost of f . The supplier charges a
wholesale price c(Q) = wQ, for Q units of capacity. The wholesale price w is a decision by the
supplier that the retailer would like to influence through the profit sharing arrangement.
Let ΠC denote the expected profit made by the supply chain in a centralized setting.
ΠC = EPs,D
[
Ps︸︷︷︸
Price
min(Q,D)︸ ︷︷ ︸
QuantitySold
]
− f ×Q︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost
. (1)
In the traditional Nash bargaining approach, the profits allocated to the retailer (ΠR) and
supplier (ΠS) are obtained by solving
max
α
{
(ΠR − g)δ(ΠS − b)1−δ
∣∣∣ΠR = αΠC , ΠS = (1− α)ΠC},
assuming all parameters are known, where g and b are the outside option value for the retailer
and supplier respectively. The parameter δ is the relative bargaining power of the retailer. The
profit ΠR of the retailer is thus obtained by solving the Nash bargaining solution.
This analysis however requires qualitative judgment of the relative bargaining power of the
retailer and the supplier, and ignores the other economic and strategic considerations of the
parties involved (e.g., the setting of the wholesale price w by the supplier). It assumes that the
bargaining outcome has no effect on the profit Π in the decentralized setting, which is often
violated in practice, as the profit share decision affects the capacity investment decision Q made
by the firm, and thus affects the profit Π. Furthermore, the supplier can also extract rents
through judicious choice of wholesale price decision w.
In the decentralized setting, consider the net profit of the retailer, denoted by
Π = EPs,D
[
Psmin(Q,D)
]
− w ×Q. (2)
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The retailer allocates a share γ of the total profit Π to the supplier. In this paper, we model
directly the impact of profit share 1 − γ accrued by the retailer, on the investment decision Q
made by the retailer in response to the wholesale price decision w made by the supplier. A very
common form of the wholesale price in practice is a linear wholesale price. The popularity of
linear contract has been addressed by many papers in the economics literature. For example,
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) state that the popularity of linear contracts probably lies in its
great robustness. A recent paper, Carroll (2015), using a principal-agent framework with worst-
case performance objective, shows that out of all possible contracts, a linear contract offers the
principal the best guarantee. Therefore, we restrict our analysis to a linear wholesale price. The
problem is solved in three stages.
• In Stage 1, the retailer determines the profit share 1 − γ she would retain on the profit
made. The goal is to maximize her share of the profit pie ΠR := (1 − γ)Π, allocating γΠ
to the supplier.
• In Stage 2, the supplier determines the wholesale price w(≥ 0) per unit, for the items
supplied to the retailer. Note that the actual cost per unit is f(≥ 0) for the supplier. The
firm is thus interested in maximizing the total profit
ΠS := γΠ + (w − f)Q.
• In Stage 3, the retailer chooses the optimal capacity decision Q, to maximize the profit Π,
which is given by Equation (2). Any unused capacity will be lost with zero salvage value.
In this way, the protracted bargaining process between the retailer and the supplier on the profit
sharing agreement is modelled using a multi-stage Stackelberg game. Our goal in this paper
is to develop verifiable relationships between the model parameters and the optimal decisions
obtained under the multi-stage Stackelberg game, in a distributionally robust setting.
We are interested in the situation when demand and price distributions are not known pre-
cisely at the time the contract is being negotiated. Instead, we only have information on the
means, variances and covariance of price Ps and demand D. These parameters are given by a
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matrix Σ, called the moments matrix:
Σ =

E(P 2s ) E(PsD) E(Ps)
E(PsD) E(D
2) E(D)
E(Ps) E(D) 1
 .
We assume that both parties in the Stackelberg game are ambiguity averse and plan for the worst
case. There is some distinction between risk aversion and ambiguity aversion. Risk refers to the
situation that the probabilities of possible outcomes are known, i.e., known risks, while ambiguity
refers to the situation that the probability distribution of possible outcomes is unknown, i.e.,
unknown risks. An ambiguity averse individual prefers known risk over unknown risk. In our
problem setting, without knowing the price and demand distributions, the retailer and supplier
face an ambiguity situation and both plan against the worst-case distribution, which could be
characterized.
It is easy to see that Σ is positive semi-definite with nonnegative entries for any random
Ps, D ≥ 0. Throughout this paper, capital letters in bold font denote matrices. Let
Φ(Σ0) = {(Ps, D) ; Ps, D ≥ 0, Ps, D have moments matrix Σ = Σ0}
denote the space of distributions with the prescribed moments conditions, where Σ0 is given.
All decisions are evaluated against the worst possible distribution in Φ(Σ0). That is, the first
and second moments of the demand and price, E(Ps), E(D), E(P
2
s ), E(D
2), E(PsD), should take
values from the entries of Σ0.
The distributionally robust Stackelberg game model reduces to the following problem: Let
Q(w) := argmaxQ≥0
{
−wQ+ inf
(Ps,D)∈Φ(Σ0)
EPs,D
(
Ps min(Q,D)
)}
, (3)
Π(w) := max
Q≥0
{
−wQ+ inf
(Ps,D)∈Φ(Σ0)
EPs,D
(
Ps min(Q,D)
)}
. (4)
Our goal is to choose the profit sharing formula γ based on solving the following model:
(Model M) : max
γ≥0
(1− γ)Π(w(γ)), (5)
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where w(γ), for given γ, is chosen to maximize the supplier’s profit function:
w(γ) :=
Supplier’s Problem︷ ︸︸ ︷
argmaxw≥0
[
(w − f)Q(w) + γ
{
max
Q≥0
{
−wQ+ inf
(Ps,D)∈Φ(Σ0)
EPs,D
(
Ps min(Q,D)
)}}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Retailer’s Stage 3 Problem
]
(6)
This allows us to study the profit sharing model using a very parsimonious setup that uses only
moments information on demand and selling price. Surprisingly, this model permits a very simple
solution.
4 The Robust Newsvendor Problem: Closed-Form Solu-
tion
In the rest of the paper, we derive formally the main results obtained in this paper. Given the
wholesale price w per unit of capacity from the supplier, the retailer’s problem in the last stage
is to maximize the worst-case profit of the supply chain over the space of demand and price
distributions with the moment constraint, by choosing the optimal capacity decision Q. The
robust newsvendor problem (PR) can be formulated as:
(PR) : max
Q≥0
{
Π = −wQ+ inf
(Ps,D)∈Φ(Σ0)
EPs,D
(
Ps min(Q,D)
)}
.
In the literature (Moon and Gallego (1994), Scarf (1958)), closed-form solution is derived for
the robust newsboy problem, when only the demand is random and we have partial information
regarding its mean and variance. However, the problem here is more challenging as there are
two random variables with only information about their means, variances, and covariance. To
tackle the problem, we use an indirect approach by first transforming it into positive semi-definite
program.
Let I(1) denote the event {D ≤ Q} and I(2) denote the event {D > Q}. Define the variables
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
y(i)
P (i)
D(i)
PP (i)
DD(i)
PD(i)

=

Prob(I(i))
E(Ps|I(i))Prob(I(i))
E(D|I(i))Prob(I(i))
E(P 2s |I(i))Prob(I(i))
E(D2|I(i))Prob(I(i))
E(PsD|I(i))Prob(I(i))

, for i = 1, 2. (7)
Using conditional expectation, we can decompose the second stage profit function into
EPs,D
(
min
{
PsD, PsQ
})
= EPs,D
(
PsD
∣∣∣D ≤ Q)Prob(D ≤ Q) + EPs,D(PsQ∣∣∣D > Q)Prob(D > Q)
= PD(1) +QP (2). (8)
Proposition 1 The inner problem in the robust newsvendor problem (PR) can be formulated as
the following completely positive program2 (CPP):
min
Mi,i=1,2
{
PD(1) +QP (2)
}
subject to
(A) : Mi =

PP (i) PD(i) P (i)
PD(i) DD(i) D(i)
P (i) D(i) y(i)
  0, i = 1, 2,
(B) : Mi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2,
(C) : M1 + M2 = Σ0.
Remark 1 A symmetric matrix A of size n is completely positive (denoted A CP 0) if it
can be written as BBT , where B ∈ <n×m has nonnegative entries. It is known that if n ≤
4, then A is completely positive if and only if it is positive semi-definite and has all entries
nonnegative (Berman and Shaked-Monderer (2003)). Hence, the minimization problem in the
above proposition is a completely positive program.
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Proposition 1 implies that the inner problem in the robust problem (PR) can be rewritten
as:
min
Mi,i=1,2
Tr


0 1/2 0
1/2 0 0
0 0 0
M1 +

0 0 Q/2
0 0 0
Q/2 0 0
M2
 (9)
subject to constraints (A), (B) and (C).
We can find the dual of this completely positive program. Let Y1,Y2 denote the dual variables
associated with constraint (B) and Y denote the dual variable associated with constraint (C).
By taking the dual of Problem (9),we have
max
Y1,Y2,Y
−Tr(Σ0Y) (10)
s.t.
Y  −

0 0 Q/2
0 0 0
Q/2 0 0
+ Y2,
Y  −

0 1/2 0
1/2 0 0
0 0 0
+ Y1, Y1 ≥ 0,Y2 ≥ 0.
Note that since Problem (10) is convex and strictly feasible, strong duality holds (Boyd and
Vandenberghe (2004)), with its optimal value equal to that of Problem (9).
Adding the outer problem, we can obtain the dual CPP formulation of the robust problem
(PR) as shown in the following theorem. The dual is again a positive semi-definite programming
problem.
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Theorem 1 The robust problem (PR) can be reformulated as a dual CPP as follows:
max
Q≥0,Y1,Y2,Y
−wQ− Tr(Σ0Y) (11)
s.t.
Y  −

0 0 Q/2
0 0 0
Q/2 0 0
+ Y2,
Y  −

0 1/2 0
1/2 0 0
0 0 0
+ Y1, Y1 ≥ 0,Y2 ≥ 0.
To simplify the formulation, we perform a linear transformation on Y in Problem (11), by
adding

0 1/2 0
1/2 0 0
0 0 0
 to it, to obtain the following equivalent problem, which we will consider
from this point onwards:
max
Q≥0,Y1,Y2,Y
−wQ− Tr(Σ0Y) + E(PsD) (12)
s.t.
Y  1
2

0 1 −Q
1 0 0
−Q 0 0
+ Y2,
Y  Y1, Y1 ≥ 0,Y2 ≥ 0.
Let (Q∗,Y∗1,Y
∗
2,Y
∗) be an optimal solution to Problem (12). Note that Problem (12) is a
dual CPP with matrices of size three. Let Π(w) denote the optimal objective value to Problem
(12).
In the following proposition, we observe an important property of Problem (12).
Proposition 2 Π(w) is convex decreasing in w.
To solve Problem (12), and thus the robust problem (PR), we first solve a simpler version
of the problem, and then use the optimal solution constructed to recover the solution to the
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original robust problem (PR). By setting Y1,Y2 in Problem (12) to zero, the simpler problem
is obtained as follows:
max
Q≥0,Y
−wQ− Tr(Σ0Y) + E(PsD) (13)
s.t.
Y  1
2

0 1 −Q
1 0 0
−Q 0 0
 , Y  0,
Let (Q∗r,Y
∗
r) be an optimal solution to Problem (13). For ease of exposition, we define the
following terms:
Definition 1 Define α(w) = E(Ps)/2− w, β = E(P 2s )/4.
Theorem 2 For Problem (13), the optimal solution Q∗r is greater than zero if and only if
w <
1
2
[√
E(P 2s )
E(D2)
E(D) + E(Ps)
]
, (14)
in which case,
Q∗r = E(D) +
α(w)√
β − α(w)2σ(D), (15)
and the worst-case profit is
Πwst = −wQ∗r + inf
(Ps,D)∈Φ(Σ0)
E(Ps min(D,Q
∗
r))
= α(w)E(D)− σ(D)
√
(β − α(w)2) + 1
2
E(PsD), (16)
where σ(D) is the standard deviation of demand D.
Remark 2 Theorem 2 in fact presents a closed-form expression for the robust newsvendor prob-
lem when Ps and D are not restricted to be nonnegative. In this case, when the condition (14) is
not met, namely, w is larger or equal to the given threshold, no investment will be made. This
places a bound on the wholesale price set by the supplier. Otherwise, we can obtain the optimal
capacity, Q∗r, and the resulting worst-case profit, Πwst, in closed-form.
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In the following theorem, we recover the solution to Problem (12) (and the original robust ca-
pacity investment problem (PR)), using the dual constructed from this simpler problem, Problem
(13).
Theorem 3 For the robust problem (PR), if
w ≤ 1
2
[
E(Ps) +
E(PsD)E(D)− σ(D)
√
E(P 2s )E(D
2)− E(PsD)2
E(D2)
]
, (17)
the optimal solution Q∗ is given as:
Q∗ = E(D) +
α(w)√
β − α(w)2σ(D), (18)
with the worst-case profit Π(w) = Πwst being the same as that presented in Theorem 2 by replacing
Q∗r with Q
∗. Otherwise Q∗ = 0.
Definition 2 Define wUB = 1
2
[
E(Ps) +
E(PsD)E(D)−σ(D)
√
E(P 2s )E(D
2)−E(PsD)2
E(D2)
]
.
We assume the parameters are chosen such that wUB > f . From Theorem 3, the optimal
solution Q∗ for the original problem is the same as that of the simpler problem, Problem (13),
but with a different threshold condition on w. We can check that the upper bound wUB here is
lower than the upper bound given in Theorem 2, so the non-negative constraints on Ps, D reduce
the feasible region of w. The reason is that for the simpler problem, Y1,Y2 are set to zero, which
reduces the feasible region. An interesting observation is that the optimal robust solution Q∗
only depends on the first and second moments of the demand and selling price distributions. The
correlation term E(PsD) does not affect the optimal choice of Q in the distributionally robust
problem. If the threshold condition (17) is not satisfied, the retailer is better off not ordering
anything.
Scarf (1958) obtains the min-max solution for a newsvendor problem with unit cost c, and
unit selling price p. Note that the newsvendor problem is a special case of our problem, with Ps
being constant. In this case, let Ps = p and w = c. It can be verified that our result in Theorem
3 reduces to Scarf’s formula, with exactly the same Q∗ and the corresponding condition. Thus
our result generalizes Scarf’s formula to a more general setting when both demand and price are
random.
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The following useful inequality (Scarf’s bound) is well known:
E
[
(D −Q)+
]
≤ 1
2
[
E(D)−Q+
√
(E(D)−Q)2 + (E(D2)− E(D)2)
]
.
This bound has found applications in a variety of domains from finance to supply chain man-
agement. As a by-product, our analysis actually yields an extension of this classical inequality
to the case when the price Ps is also random.
Corollary 1 If price Ps and demand D are both random, the following bound holds:
E
[
Ps(D −Q)+
]
≤ 1
2
[
E(PsD)−QE(Ps) +
√
E(P 2s )
√
(E(D)−Q)2 + (E(D2)− E(D)2)
]
.
The above bound follows from Proposition 1 and the proof of Theorem 2.
It is well known in the literature that for the min-max newsvendor problem, the worst pos-
sible distribution of demand only has positive mass at two points. We find that the worst-case
distribution for the robust problem (PR) is a three-point distribution as characterized in Propo-
sition 6 in the Appendix. We verify that under the special case when Ps becomes a constant, our
three-point worst-case distribution reduces to the two-point distribution of Gallego and Moon
(1993) (Lemma 2, Remark 2). Hence, our three-point distribution generalizes the literature on
the min-max newsvendor problem to a more challenging setting when the random elements are
two dimensional (demand D and price Ps).
The min-max order quantity obtained by Scarf (1958) has been pointed out to be too con-
servative, because the order quantity would be zero under certain condition. However, as shown
in Perakis and Roels (2008) and Wagner (2015), when we focus on the range of contract prices
that induce a positive order quantity, the min-max order quantity is not much different than
the risk-neutral order quantities under well-known distributions. For our robust newsvendor
problem with both demand and price being random, we also make the comparison. Consider
the following problem setting: E(D) = 100, σ(D) = 30, E(Ps) = 40, σ(Ps) = 15, ρ = 0.5,
f = 5. Figure 1 compares the robust order quantity given by Equation (18) with the risk-neutral
order quantity obtained assuming bivariate normal distribution with the above given moments,
by changing the wholesale price w. In this setting, the wholesale price should be in the range
of production cost f and the expected selling price E(Ps). However, as the upper bound on the
wholesale price to guarantee a positive robust order quantity is wUB = 36.79, we will restrict w
17
in this range. In fact, for many problem cases, wUB is found to be quite close to E[Ps], so only
when the wholesale price is close to the selling price, it will result in not ordering in the robust
setting. We can observe from the comparison that the two order quantities are quite close, with
the robust quantity slightly lower. In the following sections, we will consider the case that the
supplier chooses a wholesale price that induces a positive order quantity from the retailer.
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Figure 1: Comparison between the robust and the risk-neutral order quantities
5 The Profit Sharing Contract Design Problem
For the supplier, in anticipation of the retailer’s robust decision Q(w) for given wholesale price
w, his ambiguity-averse solution is to choose an optimal wholesale price w ≥ f , for the given
profit share γ, such that his worst-case profit ΠS is maximized, where
ΠS = (w − f)Q(w) + γΠ(w)
=
 (w − f)Q(w) + γ
[
−wQ(w) + inf(Ps,D)∈Φ(Σ0) EPs,D
(
Ps min{D,Q(w)}
)]
, if w ≤ wUB
0, if w > wUB
Note that
Π(w) = −wQ(w) + inf
(Ps,D)∈Φ(Σ0)
EPs,D
(
Ps min{D,Q(w)}
)
= α(w)E(D)− σ(D)
√
β − α(w)2 + 1
2
E(PsD),
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for w ≤ wUB, by Theorem 3.
Let Π1(w) = (w − f)Q(w). The supplier’s worst-case profit, under the profit sharing agree-
ment, is therefore given by
ΠS(w, γ) = Π1(w) + γΠ(w), for w ≤ wUB.
To determine the optimal wholesale price w, the supplier needs to solve
w(γ) := argmaxf≤w≤wUB
{
Π1(w) + γΠ(w)
}
. (19)
Figure 2 presents the general shape of the supplier’s revenue (when f = 0) as a function
of the wholesale price w and profit share parameter γ. For each γ, finding the corresponding
optimal wholesale price for the supplier is a complex non-linear problem.
Figure 2: The worst-case revenue of the supplier as a function of (γ, w)
5.1 Relationship between w and Q, γ
We now examine how the optimal wholesale price w changes with γ. Note that when γ = 1,
the supply chain is vertically integrated and the supplier chooses w = f to maximize the supply
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chain profit3. On the other hand, when γ = 0, the problem reduces to the classical wholesale
price optimization problem. For intermediate value of γ, we can project out the inner retailer’s
optimization problem in the supplier’s problem, to solve a single variable optimization problem
as shown in Equation (19) to obtain w(γ) as a function of the profit sharing formula γ.
We present the following propositions.
Proposition 3 Q(w) is strictly decreasing in w ∈ [f, wUB].
This proposition is in line with our intuition that the retailer orders less, if the wholesale price
increases.
Proposition 4 (a) w(γ) > f for all γ ∈ [0, 1).
(b) The supplier’s optimal wholesale price w(γ) is decreasing in γ ∈ [0, 1).
Part (a) of Proposition 4 indicates that in the distributionally robust setting under a profit sharing
contract, the wholesale price charged by the supplier is strictly larger than his production cost.
Part (b) states that the two contract parameters, w and γ move in opposite direction. From
Proposition 2, we know that the total profit, Π(w), decreases in the wholesale price, so the
intuition here is that if the supplier gets a larger profit share γ, he will charge a lower wholesale
price w to induce the retailer to order more to increase the overall profit.
5.2 Relationship between γ and Q
In anticipation of the supplier’s optimal choice of the wholesale price w∗(γ), the retailer’s problem
is to determine the optimal profit share parameter γ∗ to maximize her worst-case profit given
by:
ΠR = (1− γ)Π(w(γ)).
By Proposition 2, Π(w) decreases with w. On the other hand, w(γ) is decreasing in γ by
Proposition 4. Hence Π(w(γ)) is increasing in γ. More interestingly, the profit (1 − γ)Π(w(γ))
is the product of two functions, one decreasing in γ, and another increasing in γ. Intuitively,
the optimal profit share parameter γ∗ for the retailer should be an interior solution. However,
as there is no closed-form expression for w∗(γ), we cannot write the retailer’s profit ΠR as an
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explicit function of the profit share γ, so finding the optimal γ∗ turns out to be a challenging
problem and can only be obtained through numerical methods.
We solve the problem indirectly by addressing the following question next: How should the
retailer choose the right profit share parameter γ to ensure that the supplier will respond with a
wholesale price w(γ) such that Q = Q(w(γ))?
Let α(w) = E(Ps)/2− w. For given wholesale price w ≤ wUB, the optimal order quantity is
Q(w) = E(D) + σ(D)
α(w)√
β − α(w)2 .
We can invert the above expression to obtain
α(Q) =

√
β
/√
1 +
(
σ(D)
Q−E(D)
)2
, if Q ≥ E(D),
−√β
/√
1 +
(
σ(D)
Q−E(D)
)2
, if Q < E(D).
We know that the retailer will choose capacity investment level of Q if the supplier sets the
wholesale price at
w(Q) = E(Ps)/2− α(Q) =

E(Ps)
2
−√β
/√
1 +
(
σ(D)
Q−E(D)
)2
, if Q ≥ E(D),
E(Ps)
2
+
√
β
/√
1 +
(
σ(D)
Q−E(D)
)2
, if Q < E(D).
On the other hand, the profit seeking supplier will set the wholesale price to be w∗ if it
optimizes its profit ΠS. Note that the first order condition of optimization problem (19) is
necessary (but may not be sufficient) for optimality, and it has to hold at w∗. We have γ(Q) = 0
if and only if w∗ = w0, where w0 (f < w0 ≤ wUB) is defined in Definition 3 below, while γ(Q) = 1
if and only if w∗ = f . For γ(Q) ∈ (0, 1), by Proposition 4, w∗ is in the interior of f and wUB. In
this case, we have w∗ satisfies the first order optimality condition:
∂ΠS
∂w
(w∗, γ) =
dΠ1
dw
(w∗) + γ
dΠ
dw
(w∗) = 0.
Hence, to induce the profit seeking supplier to set a wholesale price of w∗ = w(Q), the retailer
only needs to choose
γ(Q) = −
dΠ1
dw
(w(Q))
dΠ
dw
(w(Q))
. (20)
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This set of parameters will ensure that the retailer’s order quantity in the Stackelberg game is
precisely Q. An explicit expression for γ(Q) is given in Theorem 4 below. Note that in the above
arguments, w(Q) must lie in [f, w0], while Q must lie in [Ql, Qu], where w0, Ql and Qu are defined
as follows:
Definition 3 Define w0 = w(γ = 0) and Qu = Q(f), Ql = Q(w0).
Putting everything together, we have the following main result:
Theorem 4 The outcome of the Stackelberg game is Q ∈ [Ql, Qu]4 when the retailer chooses
γ = 1− (E(Ps)/2− f − α(Q))σ(D)β
(β − α(Q)2)3/2Q
, for Q ∈ (Ql, Qu)
where
α(Q) =

√
β
/√
1 +
(
σ(D)
Q−E(D)
)2
, if Q ≥ E(D),
−√β
/√
1 +
(
σ(D)
Q−E(D)
)2
, if Q < E(D).
For Q = Ql, then choose γ = 0 and for Q = Qu, then choose γ = 1.
This result is interesting as it posits a non-linear connection between 1− γ, the profit share
accrued by the retailer, and the level of capacity investment Q by the retailer and the wholesale
price w by the supplier involved in the supply chain.
We can now answer the main question posed in this paper: How should the retailer determine
the profit share parameter γ to maximize the profit the retailer can obtain? Instead of optimizing
over γ, which is difficult, we optimize over α. For a given α, where α = E(Ps)/2− w, the profit
that the retailer obtains from the supply chain can be rewritten as a function of α by substituting
Π = Πwst:
(1− γ)Π = (E(Ps)/2− f − α)σ(D)β(
E(D) + α√
β−α2
σ(D)
)
(β − α2)3/2
×
(
αE(D)− σ(D)
√
β − α2 + E(PsD)/2
)
.(21)
By optimizing the above function over α ∈
[
E(Ps)
2
− wu, E(Ps)2 − wl
]
to obtain α∗, we can set the
optimal profit share parameter γ∗ as
γ∗ = 1− (E(Ps)/2− f − α
∗)σ(D)β(
E(D) + α
∗√
β−(α∗)2σ(D)
)
(β − (α∗)2)3/2
. (22)
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The retailer’s profit in Equation (21) is a complicated function in α. The following example
shows the general shape of the retailer’s profit function with the change of α and f .
Example 1 Consider the case when demand and price are independent, with E(D) = 100,
σ(D) = 50, E(Ps) = 40, σ(Ps) = 15, γ = 0.2. We can plot the function (1− γ)Π in terms of the
parameter f and α in Figure 3.
Figure 3: The retailer’s profit as a function of α and f
6 Price Dependent Stochastic Demand Model
In the previous analysis, we focus on the model in which both the demand and selling price
are exogenous and random, and can be arbitrarily correlated. The general moments matrix
captures the price and demand correlation with the cross moment term E[PsD]. In this section
we investigate the case that the selling price is an internal decision of firms as in monopoly
markets. In the literature, price dependent stochastic demand models have been widely used to
address the joint pricing and inventory decisions (readers may refer to Petruzzi and Dada (1999)
for an excellent review of earlier works along this line of research). Raza (2014) investigates the
distribution-free approach to the newsvendor problem with pricing decision. With linear price
dependent demand model, the author shows that the profit function is quasi-concave in price and
demand, and proposes a sequential search process to solve the optimal price and robust inventory
decisions. To internalize the pricing decision, we model explicitly the dependency between the
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selling price and demand by a linear price dependent stochastic demand function, and show that
this problem is a special case of our general model.
To see the connection, consider the case when both demand and selling price are functions
of a common factor τ , say Ps(τ) = τ , and D(τ) = a − bτ + ε, where ε is a random component
with zero mean and standard deviation σ. The objective is to jointly determine the selling price
Ps, i.e. τ , and the order quantity Q to maximize the resulting worst-case expected profit in
the distributionally robust setting. This setup implies the following conditions on the first two
moments of Ps and D:
E(Ps) = τ
E(P 2s ) = τ
2
E(D) = a− bτ
E(D2) = (a− bτ)2 + σ2
E(PsD) = τ(a− bτ).
The robust order quantity Q∗(τ) can be solved by Equation (15) for moments given in the above
equations:
Q(τ, w) = a− bτ + τ/2− w√
τ 2/4− (τ/2− w)2σ,
and the worst-case expected profit is given by Equation (16) as follows:
Π(τ, w) = (τ/2− w)(a− bτ)− σ
√
(τ 2/4− (τ/2− w)2) + 1
2
τ(a− bτ).
The optimal price can be solved by the first order condition of function Π(τ, w) for each w. This
recovers the solution obtained by Raza (2014) for the pricing problem with limited distribution
information, when price and demand are linearly related.
Our approach actually recovers more. By Equations (21) and (22), the retailer can actually
jointly optimize the price and the profit sharing formula as follows:
max
α,τ

σ τ
2
4
(
τ/2− f − α
)
(a− bτ + σ α√
τ2
4
−α2
)
√
( τ
2
4
− α2)3
×
(
(a− bτ)α− σ
√
τ 2
4
− α2 + τ(a− bτ)/2
) (23)
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to obtain the optimal α∗ and τ ∗, and the optimal profit sharing formula γ∗ is then obtained by
γ∗ = 1−
σ (τ
∗)2
4
(
τ ∗/2− f − α∗
)
Q(τ ∗, τ ∗/2− α∗)
√
( (τ
∗)2
4
− (α∗)2)3
. (24)
7 Numerical Experiments
We use a set of numerical experiments to understand how the proposed technique works. The
following common parameters are used in the example: the mean and standard deviation of the
demand and price distributions are as follows, E(D) = 100, σ(D) = 50, E(Ps) = 40, σ(Ps) = 15.
Since the optimal capacity investment decision is independent of the demand-price correlation,
without loss of generality, we set the correlation coefficient ρ = 0.5, and the partial demand and
price information is given by the following moments matrix:
Σ =

E(P 2s ) E(PsD) E(Ps)
E(PsD) E(D
2) E(D)
E(Ps) E(D) 1
 =

1825 4375 40
4375 12500 100
40 100 1
 .
Figure 4 depicts the supplier’s optimal choice of wholesale price w∗ = w(γ) as functions of the
profit sharing parameter γ. As expected, w∗ decreases with γ, reflecting the trade-off between the
supplier’s two sources of profit. The supplier charges a higher wholesale price w when it takes a
smaller share of the profit made by the retailer. In addition, the optimal wholesale price increases
with the supplier’s internal capacity cost f , for fixed γ. This makes sense, as the supplier needs
to charge a higher wholesale price to recover the higher capacity cost.
Figure 5 shows the retailer’s optimal capacity investment decision Q∗ = Q(w(γ)) as functions
of the profit share parameter γ with the corresponding wholesale price chosen optimally by the
supplier. We can observe that Q∗ increases with γ, since the wholesale price decreases with
γ, and Q∗ decreases with the wholesale price. Furthermore, Q∗ decreases with the supplier’s
capacity cost f for fixed γ, due to the higher wholesale price charged by the supplier for higher
capacity cost.
Figure 6 and Figure 7 present how the worst-case profits of the supplier and the retailer
change with γ. Interestingly, the supplier’s worst-case profit increases with γ, so the supplier
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Figure 4: The supplier’s optimal wholesale
price w∗ as functions of γ
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Figure 5: The retailer’s optimal capacity in-
vestment quantity Q∗ as functions of γ
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Figure 6: The supplier’s worst-case profit as
functions of γ
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Figure 7: The retailer’s worst-case profit as
functions of γ
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prefers the profit share γ to be as large as possible. However, the retailer’s profit is unimodal,
attaining the maximum for some γ strictly between 0 and 1. Thus, the retailer would select
the profit sharing parameter γ corresponding to this maximum point on its profit performance
curve. This point would predict the equilibrium of the three-stage Stackelberg game. It is not
surprising that the retailer’s profit decreases with the unit cost f .
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we solve the profit sharing agreement problem in an ambiguity averse supply chain
with price and demand uncertainty. We formulate the problem as a Stackelberg game, and show
that compared with the case without profit sharing (γ = 0, i.e., the wholesale price case), the
Stackelberg equilibrium chooses a profit share parameter γ∗ in (0, 1), such that (i) the retailer
has a higher worst-case profit, and (ii) the supplier has a higher worst-case profit, and hence the
supply chain is more efficient. If the profit share of the supplier is smaller than this threshold
γ∗, then both the retailer and the supplier will be worse off in terms of the profit accrued to each
of them. On the other hand, a share higher than γ∗ accrued to the supplier will only benefit
the supplier, but hurt the retailer. Thus a careful calibration of the contractual elements in the
profit sharing agreements is crucial for the retailer. Furthermore, the worst-case profit for both
the retailer and the supplier dominates the pure wholesale price model (with no profit sharing).
These results indicate that in an ambiguity averse supply chain, the profit sharing agreement
approach is generally more beneficial to both parties involved, compared with the traditional
wholesale price contract.
Our paper also develops new analytical insights on the profit share parameter and the optimal
capacity invested in the supply chain. By projecting out the role of wholesale price w, we show
that the profit share parameter γ and the corresponding optimal order decision Q should satisfy
the relationship
1− γ =
(
E(Ps)/2− f − α(Q)
)
σD(E(P
2
s )/4)
(E(P 2s )/4− α(Q)2)3/2Q
,
27
where
α(Q) =

√
E(P 2s )/4
/√
1 +
(
σD
Q−E(D)
)2
, if Q ≥ E(D)
−√E(P 2s )/4
/√
1 +
(
σD
Q−E(D)
)2
, if Q < E(D)
The results obtained in this paper generalize a long series of work in the area of distribution-
free newsvendor problem (initiated by Scarf (1958)), including the price optimization variant
studied in Raza (2014). These results can also be used to check whether the outcomes (ordering
decision, wholesale price) are consistent with a distributionally robust Stackelberg game model,
and can be extended to handle price optimization when the mean demand is related to price
through a factor model, and to deal with information asymmetry in case the supplier and retailer
possess different beliefs on the moment conditions on demand and selling price.
The model proposed in this paper can be extended in different directions. In our approach,
we have assumed that the supplier uses a linear wholesale price w to sell to the retailer. In
practice, the supplier can also offer quantity discount or other kind of contracts to extract the
appropriate profits from the retailer. This can be handled by splitting the order size into distinct
segments, with a different wholesale price for each segment. Optimizing the wholesale prices over
the distinct segments turns out to be technically challenging, and we are not aware of a tractable
solution to this variant of the problem considered in this paper.
Endnotes
1. http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/01/13/how-to-stop-rise-in-food-price-volatility
2. The study of completely positive programs has gained considerable interests in recent years.
Relevant literature includes Burer (2012) and Du¨r (2010).
3. In this case, note that the retailer will be indifferent to the choice of w and Q, since it
gets no share of the profit. We assume the solution concept adopted is the Strong Stackelberg
Equilibrium, i.e., the retailer will pick Q to maximize the payoff of the supplier, if there are
multiple optimal solutions available for the retailer.
4. The outcome of the Stackelberg game Q cannot lie outside [Ql, Qu] when each party seeks
to maximize its worst-case profit.
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Appendix A: Applications
1. Information Asymmetry
Our model can be extended to incorporate information asymmetry in the decentralized supply
chain. This is motivated by Wagner (2015), who studied its impact in a decentralized supply
chain with price-only contract. In Wagner’s model, the supplier and retailer may know either the
full distribution or just the first and second moments of the random demand, with the price fixed.
Our model with profit sharing is considerably more difficult, because the different information
set will lead to different assessment of the newsvendor profit, which will affect how the players
share the profits.
More precisely, we consider the case that the supplier and the retailer possess asymmetric
information about the market demand and selling price, i.e., the moments matrix Σ. That is,
the retailer knows Σ = Σ0, and is aware that the supplier only knows Σ ∈ Θ for some set Θ.
Let wUBΣ , QΣ(w) and ΠΣ(w) denote the upper bound for the wholesale price, the capacity
decision of Equation (18) and the worst-case profit of Equation (16) as defined in Section 3,
for any Σ ∈ Θ. In this case, without knowing the actual value of Σ, the supplier solves for
the optimal wΘ(γ) against the worst possible case in the set Θ, for given γ, to maximize the
supplier’s profit function:
wΘ(γ) :=
Supplier’s Problem︷ ︸︸ ︷
argmaxw≥f
{
min
Σ∈Θ:wUBΣ ≥w
[
(w − f)QΣ(w) + γΠΣ(w)
]}
.
In this setting, the retailer has to solve the following problem:
(Model M ′) : max
γ∈[0,1]
(1− γ)ΠΣ0(wΘ(γ)).
Let γΘ(w) := γ when w = wΘ(γ). We solve instead the problem on w
5:
max
w∈[f,wΘ(1)]
(1− γΘ(w))ΠΣ0(w).
Our solution approach thus depends on the difficulty of the task to infer γΘ(w). To illustrate
the idea, we consider D = θ + ε, where θ captures the average demand, and ε is a random noise
with zero mean and standard deviation σD. In the following Example 2, we analyze the case
that the retailer and supplier have asymmetric information about the demand size θ. The cases
of asymmetric information on other parameters can be analyzed similarly.
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Example 2 Asymmetric information about demand size θ
As retailers are closer to market, we assume that the retailer knows the actual value of θ, which
is θ0 when the contract is signed, but the supplier only knows that θ lies in the range of [θL, θH ].
The information on ε, Ps and ρ are common knowledge. Furthermore, E(Ps) ≥ f ensures that
the average selling price is greater than the cost of production. Note that for any θ ∈ [θL, θH ],
Qθ(w) = θ +
α(w)√
E(P 2s )/4− α(w)2
σD,
and
Πθ(w) = α(w)θ − σD
√
E(P 2s )/4− α(w)2 +
1
2
(E(Ps)θ + ρσDσPs) ,
whenever w < wUBθ , and α(w) = E(Ps)/2 − w. When the market condition θ is unknown, the
supplier maximizes the worst-case expected profit as follows:
max
w≥f
min
θ∈[θL,θH ]:w≤wUBθ
{
[(1− γ)w − f + γE(Ps)]θ + (w − f)α(w)− γ(E(P
2
s )/4− α(w)2)√
E(P 2s )/4− α(w)2
σD +
1
2
γρσDσPs
}
.
Since E(Ps) and w are both greater than f , the coefficient of θ is positive and therefore the above
problem reduces to
max
w≥f
{
[(1− γ)w − f + γE(Ps)]θL + (w − f)α(w)− γ(E(P
2
s )/4− α(w)2)√
E(P 2s )/4− α(w)2
σD +
1
2
γρσDσPs
}
.
The retailer can determine the optimal profit sharing formula in this case by solving
max
w≥f
(1− γθL(w))Πθ0(w),
where
γθL(w) = 1−
σ(D)E(P
2
s )
4
(w − f)
QθL(w)
√
(E(P
2
s )
4
− (E(Ps)/2− w)2)3
.
If θ0 is indeed in [θL, θU ], then QθL(w) ≤ Qθ0(w), and thus γθL(w) ≤ γθ0(w). We have
max
w≥f
(1− γθL(w))Πθ0(w) ≥ max
w≥f
(1− γθ0(w))Πθ0(w).
Hence the retailer can always exploit the information asymmetry to generate more profits in the
supply chain, compared to the symmetric setting. On the other hand, if the supplier’s informa-
tion set is not accurate, for example θ0 < θL, then it is better off for the retailer to share her
information on θ0 in order to generate more profits in the supply chain.
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2. Consistency Test
Afriat (1967) initiates the research on the following question: “what restrictions on the data
set are necessary and sufficient for it to be consistent with observations drawn from a utility-
maximizing consumer?” A large body of literature, both theoretical and empirical, has been built
around this theme. Brown and Matzkin (1996) extend this research to derive testable restrictions
on outcomes that are consistent with a Walrasian equilibrim in an exchange economy. Carvajal
et al. (2013) develop tests for outcomes (prices and quantities) in a class of Cournot game to be
consistent with convex ordering costs, by solving an LP.
We can use the results obtained in this paper to derive testable conditions for the distribution-
ally robust Stackelberg game model. For instance, given a set of T observations {(Ps[t], Q[t], w[t], γ[t])}Tt=1
on prices, order quantities, wholesale prices and profit sharing terms in a decentralized supply
chain, can we test whether the data are consistent with the following model in a distributionally
robust setting:
production cost of the supplier is a linear function, and the average demand of the
product is a convex decreasing function of price Ps?
Using Equations (18) and (22), and assuming Ps is deterministic, the model output must
satisfy the following relationship:
σ(Dt) =
(1− γ[t])Q[t]
√(
P 2s [t]
4
− (Ps[t]
2
− w[t])2
)3
P 2s [t]
4
(
w[t]− f
) , (25)
so
E(Dt) = Q[t]−

Ps[t]
2
− w[t]√
P 2s [t]
4
−
(
Ps[t]
2
− w[t]
)2σ(Dt)
 (26)
must be a convex decreasing function in Ps[t], for some production cost parameter f . If we
assume further that Ps[1] ≤ Ps[2] . . . ≤ Ps[T ], then the above reduces the consistency test to
checking whether
E(Dt+1)− E(Dt)
Ps[t+ 1]− Ps[t]
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is non-decreasing in t.
3. Estimating Mean Demand
We can also use our results to perform approximate inference of the (implicit) demand model
in the Stackelberg game, with a few simple observations of the output. As an illustration, suppose
we observe the following characteristics and outputs in 10 different profit sharing supply chains,
operating under a Stackelberg model as described above. The pricing information (Ps, f , w
∗),
ordering decision Q∗ etc. are publicly available. Suppose the profit sharing formula is also known
and as shown in Table 1. Can we find the corresponding mean and variance of the demand in
the supply chains?
Case E(D) E(Ps) σ(D) σ(Ps) ρ f γ w∗ Q∗
1 120 30 5 0.80 45.77 221.18
2 120 30 5 0.60 74.93 190.48
3 120 30 5 0.40 88.22 175.03
4 120 30 5 0.20 95.54 165.13
5 120 30 15 0.40 91.55 170.71
6 120 30 25 0.40 94.73 166.31
7 120 30 40 0.40 99.25 159.45
8 120 30 55 0.60 97.00 162.99
9 120 30 55 0.60 96.58 157.04
10 120 30 55 0.40 96.05 151.92
Table 1: What is the mean and standard deviation of demand?
In fact, the values obtained above are generated in the case when the ordering and wholesale
price decisions are constructed by solving a Stackelberg game model, in which price and demand
are bivariate normal, and the demand has a mean of 200 and standard deviation of 50, for ρ = 0.5
in all instances except cases 9 and 10, where ρ = 0 and −0.5 respectively.
Formula (25) and (26), extended to the case when Ps is random, provide a quick way to
estimate the mean and standard deviation of the unknown demand based on a distributionally
robust model. Interestingly, even without knowing ρ, our formula derived for the distributionally
robust model returns the following estimates for the mean and standard deviation of the demand
in the 10 instances:
The estimate for mean demand using our approach performs extremely well, compared to the
naive heuristic of using order quantity to approximate the mean demand.
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Case 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
E(D) 206.56 205.79 203.23 199.87 201.93 200.33 197.31 199.87 192.97 187.16
σ(D) 61.85 61.59 54.99 49.46 52.65 50.14 46.09 49.39 48.99 49.11
Table 2: Estimates for the mean and standard deviation
Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Given (Ps, D) ∈ Φ(Σ0), using conditional expectation, we see from
(8) that the objective function of the original inner problem (denoted by LHS hereafter) is equal
to the objective function of the CPP problem (denoted by RHS hereafter). With Mi, i = 1, 2,
defined using variables (7), it is easy to see by their definitions that M1 + M2 = Σ0. Also,
Mi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, since Ps and D are nonnegative random variables. Furthermore, since
Mi = EPs,D((Ps D 1)
T (Ps D 1)|I(i))Prob(I(i)) for i = 1, 2,
they are positive semi-definite. Hence, Mi, i = 1, 2, defined this way are feasible to the RHS. It
is then clear that LHS ≥ RHS.
We next show that LHS ≤ RHS, by constructing from the optimal solution of the RHS a distri-
bution in Φ(Σ0) attaining at least the optimal value of the LHS.
Let M∗i denote the optimal solution obtained by solving the RHS, where
M∗i =

PP ∗(i) PD∗(i) P ∗(i)
PD∗(i) DD∗(i) D∗(i)
P ∗(i) D∗(i) y∗(i)
 , i = 1, 2.
Since M∗i is positive semidefinite with nonnegative entries, it is a doubly nonnegative matrix of
order 3. By Theorem 2.4 of Berman and Shaked-Monderer (2003), M∗i is completely positive.
Therefore, M∗i can be represented as a sum of rank 1 completely positive matrices (Proposition
2.1, Berman and Shaked-Monderer (2003)),
M∗i =
ki∑
j=1

b∗j(i)1
b∗j(i)2
b∗j(i)3


b∗j(i)1
b∗j(i)2
b∗j(i)3

T
,
where b∗j(i)1, b
∗
j(i)2, b
∗
j(i)3 ≥ 0, j = 1, .., ki, i = 1, 2.
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We use the above decomposition of M∗i , i = 1, 2, to construct a discrete distribution, which is
feasible to the LHS, as follows:
P
(
(Ps, D) =
(
b∗j(i)1
b∗j(i)3
,
b∗j(i)2
b∗j(i)3
))
= b∗j(i)
2
3, j = 1, . . . , ki, i = 1, 2,
with probability of (Ps, D) taking other values equal to zero. If b
∗
j(i)3 = 0 for some j = 1, ..., ki, i =
1, 2, we let the probability above equal to zero. With this distribution, (Ps, D) is in Φ(Σ0). We
also have
EPs,D
(
min
[
PsD, PsQ
])
=
2∑
i=1
ki∑
j=1
min
[
b∗j(i)1b
∗
j(i)2
b∗j(i)
2
3
,
b∗j(i)1
b∗j(i)3
Q
]
b∗j(i)
2
3
≤ PD∗(1) +QP ∗(2).
Hence, LHS ≤ RHS. Since we also have LHS ≥ RHS, therefore, LHS = RHS.
Note that in above, we have also obtained a distribution in Φ(Σ0) that solves the LHS. 
Proof of Theorem 2: Note that solving Problem (13) is the same as solving the following
minimization problem
min
Q≥0,Y
wQ+ Tr(Σ0Y)− E(PsD) (27)
s.t.
Y  1
2

0 1 −Q
1 0 0
−Q 0 0
 , Y  0,
We will work on the above minimization problem. By transformation of variables, S1 = Σ
1/2
0 YΣ
1/2
0 ,
solving Problem (27) is equivalent to solving the following problem (here, we ignore the constant
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term −E(PsD) temporarily):
min
Q≥0,S1
wQ+ Tr(S1) (28)
s.t.
S1  12Σ1/20

0 1 −Q
1 0 0
−Q 0 0
Σ1/20 ,
S1  0
There exist orthogonal matrix U(Q) and diagonal matrix D(Q) =

d1(Q) 0 0
0 d2(Q) 0
0 0 d3(Q)

such that
1
2
Σ
1/2
0

0 1 −Q
1 0 0
−Q 0 0
Σ1/20 = U(Q)D(Q)U(Q)T .
di(Q), i = 1, 2, 3, are the eigenvalues of the left hand side matrix.
Let S = U(Q)TS1U(Q), we can further transform Problem (28) as
min
Q≥0,S
wQ+ Tr(S) (29)
s.t.
S  D(Q),
S  0.
For any feasible solution (Q,S) to Problem (29), suppose si is the main diagonal entry of S for
i = 1, 2, 3. Then we must have si ≥ max{di(Q), 0}, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3. From this observation, an optimal
solution to Problem (29), (Q∗r,S
∗
r), has
S∗r =

max{d1(Q∗r), 0} 0 0
0 max{d2(Q∗r), 0} 0
0 0 max{d3(Q∗r), 0}

with Q∗r an optimal solution to the following minimization problem in one dimension:
min
Q≥0
wQ+
3∑
i=1
max{di(Q), 0}, (30)
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Observe that di(Q), i = 1, 2, 3, are also eigenvalues of the following matrix:
Σ1 =
1
2
Σ0

0 1 −Q
1 0 0
−Q 0 0

=
1
2

E(PsD)−QE(Ps) E(P 2s ) −QE(P 2s )
E(D2)−QE(D) E(PsD) −QE(PsD)
E(D)−Q E(Ps) −QE(Ps)
 .
Computing the eigenvalues of Σ1 by solving the equation det(λI −Σ1) = 0 for λ, we have:
d1(Q) =
1
2
[
E(PsD)−QE(Ps) +
√
E(P 2s )(Q
2 − 2E(D)Q+ E(D2))
]
d2(Q) =
1
2
[
E(PsD)−QE(Ps)−
√
E(P 2s )(Q
2 − 2E(D)Q+ E(D2))
]
d3(Q) = 0.
Since Σ0 is positive semi-definite, it implies that
det(Σ0) = E(P
2
s )E(D
2) + 2E(Ps)E(D)E(PsD)− E(Ps)2E(D2)− E(P 2s )E(D)2 − E(PsD)2 ≥ 0,(31)
from which we have
(E(PsD)−QE(Ps))2 ≤ E(P 2s )(Q2 − 2E(D)Q+ E(D2)),
for all Q. The latter inequality holds since the discriminant of E(P 2s )(Q
2− 2E(D)Q+E(D2))−
(E(PsD) − QE(Ps))2 in Q is nonpositive by (31), with its coefficient of Q2 positive. It then
follows that d1(Q) ≥ 0 and d2(Q) ≤ 0 for all Q.
Let g(Q) denote the objective function of Problem (30). We have
g(Q) = wQ+ d1(Q)
= wQ+
1
2
[
E(PsD)−QE(Ps) +
√
E(P 2s )(Q
2 − 2E(D)Q+ E(D2))
]
.
Taking differentiation, we have
g′(Q) = w − 1
2
E(Ps) +
1
2
√
E(P 2s )(Q
2 − 2E(D)Q+ E(D2))−1/2(Q− E(D)), (32)
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and
g′′(Q) =
1
2
√
E(P 2s )(Q
2 − 2E(D)Q+ E(D2))−3/2(E(D2)− E(D)2) > 0.
Hence, g(Q) is a strictly convex function of Q, and since g(Q) → ∞ as Q → ∞, there exists a
unique optimal solution Q∗r ≥ 0 to Problem (30). Observe that Q∗r > 0 if and only if g′(0) < 0,
in which case, Q∗r satisfies g
′(Q∗r) = 0. We have g
′(0) < 0 if and only if
w <
1
2
[√
E(P 2s )
E(D2)
E(D) + E(Ps)
]
.
Let α and β be as given in Definition 1 . Setting g′(Q∗r) = 0. From (32), we have[
w − 1
2
E(Ps)
]
((Q∗r)
2 − 2E(D)Q∗r + E(D2))1/2 = −
[
1
2
√
E(P 2s )(Q
∗
r − E(D))
]
, (33)
from which we obtain
α2((Q∗r)
2 − 2E(D)Q∗r + E(D2)) = β((Q∗r)2 − 2E(D)Q∗r + E(D)2).
Solving for Q∗r in the above equation, we have
Q∗r = E(D)±
√
α2(E(D2)− E(D)2)
β − α2
= E(D)± |α|√
β − α2σD (34)
where σ(D) is the standard deviation of demand D. Note that (34) implies that we must have
β > α2. Substituting the above expression (34) for Q∗r into the right-hand side of (33) and
comparing with its left-hand side, we obtain
Q∗r = E(D) +
α√
β − α2σ(D).
We next obtain the worst-case profit, Πwst, which equals to the negative of the optimal objective
value of Problem (28) or equivalently, Problem (30), g(Q∗r), plus the constant term E(PsD).
Πwst = −wQ∗r −
1
2
[
E(PsD)−Q∗rE(Ps) +
√
E(P 2s )(Q
∗2
r − 2E(D)Q∗r + E(D2))
]
+ E(PsD)
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Since
(Q∗r)
2 = E2(D) +
α2
β − α2V ar(D) + 2E(D)
α√
β − α2σ(D)
2E(D)Q∗r = 2E
2(D) + 2E(D)
α√
β − α2σ(D)
(Q∗r)
2 − 2E(D)Q∗r + E(D2) = E2(D) +
α2
β − α2V ar(D)− 2E
2(D) + E(D2)
=
α2
β − α2V ar(D) + V ar(D)
=
β
β − α2V ar(D)
We have
Πwst =
(1
2
E(Ps)− w
)
Q∗r −
1
2
√
E(P 2s )((Q
∗
r)
2 − 2E(D)Q∗r + E(D2)) +
1
2
E(PsD)
= αQ∗r −
√
β · β
β − α2σ(D) +
1
2
E(PsD)
= α
(
E(D) +
α√
β − α2σ(D)
)
− β√
β − α2σ(D) +
1
2
E(PsD)
= αE(D)−
(
− α
2√
β − α2σ(D) +
β√
β − α2σ(D)
)
+
1
2
E(PsD)
= αE(D)−
√
(β − α2)σ(D) + 1
2
E(PsD)

Before we present the proof of Theorem 3, we proceed with a few results that are needed in
the proof of the theorem.
Remark 3 From the proof of Theorem 2, we can also obtain Y∗r :
Y∗r = Σ
−1/2
0 U(Q
∗
r)

d1(Q
∗
r) 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
U(Q∗r)TΣ−1/20 ,
where
U(Q∗r)

d1(Q
∗
r) 0 0
0 d2(Q
∗
r) 0
0 0 d3(Q
∗
r)
U(Q∗r)T = 12Σ1/20

0 1 −Q∗r
1 0 0
−Q∗r 0 0
Σ1/20 ,
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d1(Q
∗
r) =
1
2
[
E(PsD)−Q∗rE(Ps) +
√
E(P 2s )((Q
∗
r)
2 − 2E(D)Q∗r + E(D2))
]
d2(Q
∗
r) =
1
2
[
E(PsD)−Q∗rE(Ps)−
√
E(P 2s )((Q
∗
r)
2 − 2E(D)Q∗r + E(D2))
]
d3(Q
∗
r) = 0.
Here, U(Q∗r) = (u1, u2, u3) is an orthogonal matrix. Hence, ui, i = 1, 2, 3, are orthogonal eigen-
vectors of 1
2
Σ
1/2
0

0 1 −Q∗r
1 0 0
−Q∗r 0 0
Σ1/20 , with di(Q∗r), i = 1, 2, 3, being their corresponding
eigenvalues.
Note that the dual problem to Problem (13) is given by:
min
X1,X2
−(X1)12 + E(PsD) (35)
s.t.
X1 + X2 = Σ0
(X1)13 ≤ w
X1,X2  0.
We have the following complementary slackness conditions on Problems (13) and (35):12

0 1 −Q
1 0 0
−Q 0 0
−Y
X1 = 0, (36)
YX2 = 0, (37)
Q(w − (X1)13) = 0, (38)
Note that primal, dual feasibility conditions and the above complementary slackness condi-
tions are sufficient for optimality to Problem (13) and its dual, Problem (35), with zero duality
gap.
Let (X∗1,X
∗
2) be an optimal solution to Problem (35). We present an explicit expression for
(X∗1,X
∗
2) in the following proposition by showing that primal, dual feasibility conditions and the
above complementary slackness conditions are satisfied by this expression for (X∗1,X
∗
2).
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Proposition 5 (X∗1,X
∗
2) is given by
X∗1 = (Σ
1/2
0 u1)(Σ
1/2
0 u1)
T ,
X∗2 = (Σ
1/2
0 u2)(Σ
1/2
0 u2)
T + (Σ
1/2
0 u3)(Σ
1/2
0 u3)
T ,
where if Q∗r > 0,
Σ
1/2
0 u1 = a1

1
∆
E(P 2s )
[
1 + wQ
∗
r
d1(Q∗r)
]
w∆
E(P 2s )d1(Q
∗
r)
 , (39)
Σ
1/2
0 u2 = a2

1
∆
E(P 2s )
[
−1 + Q∗r
d2(Q∗r)
(w − E(Ps))
]
∆
E(P 2s )d2(Q
∗
r)
(w − E(Ps)),
 , (40)
Σ
1/2
0 u3 = a3

0
1
1
Q∗r
 , (41)
with ai > 0, i = 1, 2, 3, given by
a1 =
√
E(P 2s )d1(Q
∗
r)
∆
,
a2 =
√
−E(P 2s )d2(Q∗r)
∆
,
a3 = Q
∗
r
√
1− ∆
E(P 2s )
[
w2
d1(Q∗r)
− (w − E(Ps))
2
d2(Q∗r)
]
.
Here, ∆ =
√
E(P 2s )((Q
∗
r)
2 − 2E(D)Q∗r + E(D2)) > 0.
Proof: With Y = Y∗r , whose explicit expression is given in Remark 3, we can derive (X1,X2)
using (36), (37) and X1 + X2 = Σ0, as shown below
X1 = (Σ
1/2
0 u1)(Σ
1/2
0 u1)
T ,
X2 = (Σ
1/2
0 u2)(Σ
1/2
0 u2)
T + (Σ
1/2
0 u3)(Σ
1/2
0 u3)
T .
We use these as potential candidates for X∗1,X
∗
2. Except condition (38), we can check easily that
Q = Q∗r,Y = Y
∗
r and X1, X2 given above satisfy the complementary slackness conditions, (36),
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(37), as well as the primal and dual feasibility conditions, except w ≥ (X1)13. To verify condition
(38) and that w ≥ (X1)13, we need to derive a closed form expression for (X1)13.
Suppose Q∗r > 0. Let us calculate Σ
1/2
0 ui, i = 1, 2, 3. We know by Remark 3 that
1
2
Σ
1/2
0

0 1 −Q∗r
1 0 0
−Q∗r 0 0
Σ1/20 ui = di(Q∗r)ui, i = 1, 2, 3.
Then,
1
2
Σ0

0 1 −Q∗r
1 0 0
−Q∗r 0 0
Σ1/20 ui = di(Q∗r)Σ1/20 ui, i = 1, 2, 3.
Hence, Σ
1/2
0 ui is an eigenvector of
1
2
Σ0

0 1 −Q∗r
1 0 0
−Q∗r 0 0
, with eigenvalue di(Q∗r), i = 1, 2, 3.
Therefore, Σ
1/2
0 ui, i = 1, 2, 3, can be obtained by solving12Σ0

0 1 −Q∗r
1 0 0
−Q∗r 0 0
− di(Q∗r)I
x = 0, i = 1, 2, 3,
for x. Upon solving the above and after algebraic manipulations, using Q∗r = E(D)+
α√
β−α2
σ(D)
and the identity ∆ = 1
2
E(P 2s )σ(D)√
β−α2
= 1
2
E(P 2s )
Q∗r−E(D)
α
, we obtain expressions (39)-(41) for Σ
1/2
0 ui, i =
1, 2, 3.
Expressions for ai, i = 1, 2, given in the proposition are obtained by substituting (39) and (40)
respectively into the following equation:
1
2
(Σ
1/2
0 ui)
T

0 1 −Q∗r
1 0 0
−Q∗r 0 0
Σ1/20 ui = di(Q∗r),
where we have used the fact that ‖ui‖ = 1 to obtain the equation, i = 1, 2.
Finally, the expression for a3 in the proposition is obtained by observing that the (3, 3) entries
of X1,X2 sum up to 1 and then substituting what is known of Σ
1/2
0 ui, i = 1, 2, 3, ((39)-(41)) and
ai, i = 1, 2 into these (3, 3) entries.
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Using the above derivations, we have:
(X1)13 = a
2
1
w∆
E(P 2s )d1(Q
∗
r)
=
E(P 2s )d1(Q
∗
r)
∆
w∆
E(P 2s )d1(Q
∗
r)
= w.
Thus condition (38) and w ≥ (X1)13 are satisfied.
Since Q = Q∗r, Y = Y
∗
r and X1,X2 satisfy the complementary slackness conditions as well
as primal and dual feasibility conditions, these imply that X∗1 = X1 = (Σ
1/2
0 u1)(Σ
1/2
0 u1)
T and
X∗2 = X2 = (Σ
1/2
0 u2)(Σ
1/2
0 u2)
T + (Σ
1/2
0 u3)(Σ
1/2
0 u3)
T . 
Observe that the original problem (PR), which we are interested in solving, is equivalent
to the dual problem to Problem (12), i.e., Problem (35) with the additional constraints that
X1 ≥ 0,X2 ≥ 0. Hence, if Σ1/20 ui, i = 1, 2, 3, given in the statement of Proposition 5 are
nonnegative, then (X∗1,X
∗
2) is also an optimal solution to the dual of Problem (12), with Q
∗ =
Q∗r,Y
∗
1 = 0,Y
∗
2 = 0,Y
∗ = Y∗r solving Problem (12).
With the above, we are now ready to prove Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3: It is clear that Σ
1/2
0 u1 ≥ 0 in (39) and Σ1/20 u3 ≥ 0 in (41).
For Σ
1/2
0 u2 in (40), it is easy to see that if the second entry of the right-hand side vector is
nonnegative, then the last entry of the right-hand side vector is also nonnegative, and thus
Σ
1/2
0 u2 ≥ 0. We next derive the condition under which the former is true.
It can be shown upon algebraic manipulations that
−1 + Q
∗
r
d2(Q∗r)
(w − E(Ps)) ≥ 0⇔ wQ∗r + d1(Q∗r) ≤ E(PsD).
We would now like to know under what condition on w we have
wQ∗r + d1(Q
∗
r) ≤ E(PsD), (42)
that is,
wQ∗r +
1
2
[E(PsD)−Q∗rE(Ps) +
√
E(P 2s )((Q
∗
r)
2 − 2E(D)Q∗r + E(D2))] ≤ E(PsD),
where Q∗r is given in Theorem 2. Substituting the expression of Q
∗
r into the above inequality, we
have √
(β − α2)σ(D) ≤ 1
2
E(PsD) + αE(D). (43)
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By taking the square on both sides of (43), using the definitions of α and β in Definition 1, and
upon algebraic manipulations, we get
w ≤ 1
2
[
E(Ps) +
E(PsD)E(D)− σ(D)
√
E(P 2s )E(D
2)− E(PsD)2
E(D2)
]
, (44)
or
w ≥ 1
2
[
E(Ps) +
E(PsD)E(D) + σ(D)
√
E(P 2s )E(D
2)− E(PsD)2
E(D2)
]
. (45)
It can be shown by substitution into (43) that only (44) satisfies (43), and hence (42). Equality
holds for (44) if and only if equality holds for (42).
Note that if condition (44) is satisfied, then it can be shown that w satisfies (14). Hence, the
above arguments, which use the explicit expression of Q∗r given in Theorem 2, are valid, and we
have the needed Σ
1/2
0 u2 ≥ 0. Therefore, we can conclude that (X∗1,X∗2) solves the dual problem
to Problem (12), with Q∗ = Q∗r,Y
∗
1 = 0,Y
∗
2 = 0,Y
∗ = Y∗r solving Problem (12), and Problem
(12) having the optimal value as Problem (13). Hence, Q∗ = E(D) + α√
β−α2
σ(D) solves the
robust problem (PR), when w satisfies (44).
When
w =
1
2
[
E(Ps) +
E(PsD)E(D)− σ(D)
√
E(P 2s )E(D
2)− E(PsD)2
E(D2)
]
, (46)
the following equality holds,
−wQ∗r − d1(Q∗r) + E(PsD) = 0. (47)
In this case, we know that the left-hand side of (47) is the optimal value to Problem (13), which
is also the optimal value to Problem (12). When w satisfies (46), the optimal value to Problem
(12) is therefore zero. Hence, for
w ≥ 1
2
[
E(Ps) +
E(PsD)E(D)− σ(D)
√
E(P 2s )E(D
2)− E(PsD)2
E(D2)
]
,
the optimal value to Problem (12) must be equal to 0 due to its decreasing nature as w increases,
by Proposition 2, and also because it is always greater than or equal to zero for all w ≥ 0, since
it is the optimal worst-case profit for the retailer. Now, 0 is attained by the objective function
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in Problem (12) when Q = 0, Y1 =
1
2

0 1 0
1 0 0
0 0 0
, Y2 = 0 and Y = 12

0 1 0
1 0 0
0 0 0
, which are
feasible to Problem (12). We conclude then that when
w >
1
2
[
E(Ps) +
E(PsD)E(D)− σ(D)
√
E(P 2s )E(D
2)− E(PsD)2
E(D2)
]
,
Q∗ = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3: It can be calculated that for f ≤ w ≤ wUB,
dQ
dw
(w) = − βσ(D)
(β − α2)3/2 < 0. (48)

Proof of Proposition 4: Note that
dΠ
dw
(w) = −
(
E(D) + σ(D)
α√
β − α2
)
= −Q(w), (49)
dΠ1
dw
(w) = Q(w) + (w − f)dQ
dw
(w). (50)
The first order derivative of ΠS with respect to w is then given by
∂ΠS
∂w
(w, γ) = (1− γ)Q(w) + (w − f)dQ
dw
(w). (51)
Taking the cross partial derivative, we have
∂2ΠS
∂w∂γ
(w, γ) = −Q(w) < 0.
The supplier’s worst-case profit function is therefore submodular in (w, γ). It follows from Top-
kis’s theorem (Theorem 2.8.2, Topkis, 1998) that w(γ) is decreasing in γ ∈ [0, 1).
Since f < wUB, we either have w(γ) = wUB, in which case, f < w(γ), or the optimal w(γ)
satisfies the first order condition ∂ΠS
∂w
(w, γ) = 0. In the latter case, the first term on the right-
hand side of Equation (51) is positive, and from Proposition 3, we have dQ(w)
dw
< 0, so we also
have w(γ) > f . 
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Proof of Theorem 4: This expression for γ(Q) can be found by substituting Equations (48)
to (50) into Equation (20), and note that w(Q) = E(Ps)/2− α(Q):
γ(Q) =
Q(w)− (w − f) βσ(D)
(β−α2)3/2
Q(w)
= 1− (E(Ps)/2− α(Q)− f)βσ(D)
(β − α(Q)2)3/2Q .

Proposition 6 If 0 < w ≤ wUB, in which case Q∗ > 0, the worst-case distribution (P ∗s , D∗) ∈
Φ(Σ0) for the robust problem (PR) is given by
P
(
(P ∗s , D
∗) =
(
E(P 2s )d1(Q
∗)
w∆
,
d1(Q
∗) + wQ∗
w
))
=
(
a1w∆
E(P 2s )d1(Q
∗)
)2
,
P
(
(P ∗s , D
∗) =
(
E(P 2s )d2(Q
∗)
(w − E(Ps))∆ ,
−d2(Q∗) +Q∗(w − E(Ps))
w − E(Ps)
))
=
(
a2∆
E(P 2s )d2(Q
∗)
(w − E(Ps))
)2
,
P ((P ∗s , D
∗) = (0, Q∗)) =
(
a3
Q∗
)2
,
and probability of (P ∗s , D
∗) taking other values is zero.
Here, ai, i = 1, 2, 3, have explicit expressions given in Proposition 5 by replacing Q
∗
r with Q
∗ and
∆ =
√
E(P 2s )((Q
∗)2 − 2E(D)Q∗ + E(D2)) > 0. Expressions for di(Q∗), i = 1, 2, are given in
Remark 3, where Q∗r is replaced by Q
∗.
Proof : By the proof of Theorem 3, we see that if
w ≤ wUB = 1
2
[
E(Ps) +
E(PsD)E(D)− σ(D)
√
E(P 2s )E(D
2)− E(PsD)2
E(D2)
]
,
(X∗1,X
∗
2) given in Proposition 5 solves the dual problem to Problem (12). (X
∗
1,X
∗
2), X
∗
1,X
∗
2 ≥ 0,
together with Q∗,Y∗,Y∗1 and Y
∗
2 satisfy the complementary slackness conditions (36)-(38) and
primal, dual feasibility conditions for Problem (12) and its dual. Note that X∗1,X
∗
2,Y
∗,Y∗1 and
Y∗2 then satisfy primal, dual, complementary slackness conditions for Problem (9) and its dual
withQ = Q∗. Hence, (X∗1,X
∗
2) solves Problem (9) withQ = Q
∗, so we have (M∗1,M
∗
2) = (X
∗
1,X
∗
2),
where (M∗1,M
∗
2) denote an optimal solution to Problem (9) in the proof of Proposition 1. From
the proof of Proposition 1, we know how to obtain the worst-case distribution from the rank
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1 completely positive decomposition of M∗1,M
∗
2. Since M
∗
1 = X
∗
1,M
∗
2 = X
∗
2, these rank 1
completely positive decomposition are given in Proposition 5.
The condition on w ensures that the last entry of Σ
1/2
0 ui, i = 1, 2, 3, in Proposition 5 are positive.
The latter is to ensure that the worst-case distribution given in the statement of this proposition
is well-defined. 
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